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Abstract
This paper develops a theory in which heterogeneity in polit-
ical preferences produces a partisan disagreement about objective
facts. A political decision involving both idiosyncratic preferences
and scientific knowledge is considered. Voters form motivated be-
liefs in order to improve their subjective anticipation of the future
political outcome. In equilibrium, they tend to deny the scientific
arguments advocating the political orientations that run counter to
their interests. Collective denial is the strongest in societies where
contingent policy is the least likely to be implemented, either be-
cause of voters’ intrinsic preferences or because of rigidities in the
political process. The theory predicts that providing mixed evidence
produces a temporary polarization of beliefs, but that disclosing un-
equivocal information eliminates the disagreement.
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1 Introduction
Standard theories of information processing predict that disagreement
about objective facts between laypeople should decrease as the knowledge
produced by scientists becomes disseminated in the population. However,
some socio-economic and scientific issues are still fervently debated in spite
of a large consensus among experts. Climate change offers an important ex-
ample. While the scientific community has become convinced of the causal
influence of human activities on the climate, a substantial fraction of the
population remains skeptical about the validity of the theory of anthro-
pogenic climate change.1 Strikingly, the disagreement seems to be mostly
driven by individuals’ political orientation: the controversy brings into op-
position liberals, a majority of whom accepts the scientific evidence, and
conservatives, who tend to reject it (Dunlap and McCright, 2008, 2011).2 A
partisan disagreement between the left and the right of the political spec-
trum is observed in a wide range of areas, such as risk perception (e.g.,
nuclear power, genetically modified organisms), economic issues (e.g., ef-
fects on the labor market of government intervention) or judicial policies
(e.g., effectiveness of gun control policies).
While the existence of a partisan disagreement is consistent with a myr-
iad of possible theories, several facts seem incompatible with the standard
model of information processing, according to which individuals behave as
dispassionate statisticians and try to form an accurate assessment of un-
certain variables. First, some experimental evidence indicates that liberals
and conservatives not only hold different opinions on scientific issues but
also react differently to the disclosure of balanced information. In some
cases, providing mixed evidence leads to polarizing the average opinions
of both groups instead of to reducing the disagreement (Lord et al., 1979;
Plous, 1991; Munro and Ditto, 1997). Second, some experimental ma-
nipulations that vary the perceived policy implications associated with the
1Surveys of climate scientists (Anderegg et al., 2010; Farnsworth and Lichter, 2012)
find that the proportion of dissenters lies between 1% and 5%. In contrast, according
to a Gallup survey, only 57% of Americans subscribe to the theory of human-induced
climate change (Saad, 2014).
2In 2013, 78% of Democrats and 39% of Republicans agreed with the theory of
anthropogenic climate change (Saad, 2014). Among Republicans, the skepticism is so
strong that only 45% believe that the climate is warming (Pew Research Center, 2010).
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signals without affecting their informativeness have been shown to influence
the gap between liberals’ and conservatives’ beliefs about the underlying
science (Feinberg and Willer, 2010; Braman et al., 2012; Campbell and Kay,
2014).
This paper aims at providing a unified explanation for the prevalence of
partisan disagreement about scientific issues and the anomalous updating
behavior observed experimentally. It argues that many of the above facts
can be understood through the lens of motivated cognition, and analyzes
the formation of ideologically motivated beliefs in a political economy con-
text. The theory is based on well-documented psychological phenomena,
and predicts that political preferences causally influence information pro-
cessing. In contrast to existing explanations, disagreement about scientific
issues does not result from heterogeneity in prior beliefs or private infor-
mation but reflects an underlying conflict about the policy implications of
the scientific arguments.
Section 2 describes the environment. A continuum of voters makes a
binary decision a ∈ {0, 1}, e.g., regulating an industrial activity (a = 0)
or not (a = 1), in a situation of binary uncertainty, e.g., whether the
activity is polluting (ω = L) or not (ω = R). The laissez-faire policy
produces a common net benefit equal to xω, which is positive in state R
and negative in state L. In addition to this common payoff, voters have
heterogeneous preferences regarding the political decision. Each citizen
is characterized by a preference parameter v that describes their intrinsic
ordering of the courses of political action a. For instance, some individuals
oppose government intervention either because of their material interests or
on ideological grounds, whereas the opposite part of the spectrum is likely to
support regulation. In state ω, and given the political outcome a, the payoff
to a voter of type v equals (v + xω)a: the voter’s preferences for political
decisions are state independent if |v| is large enough, but state dependent
otherwise, in which case public information might influence voting behavior.
All voters hold the same prior beliefs and receive a common public sig-
nal correlated with ω. This assumption allows us to attribute any posterior
disagreement to differences in information processing. The main assump-
tion of this paper is that individuals have some “cognitive wiggle room”
to interpret the public signal. In line with the experimental evidence on
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wishful thinking, they have the opportunity to discard the signal (at some
cost) if doing so makes them more optimistic about their future payoff. As
a result, for instance, individuals endowed with a large v, namely a strong
aversion to governmental regulation, have an incentive to cast aside the
signals advocating risk-prevention policies.
The first result, presented in Section 3, is the existence of a partisan
disagreement driven by personal ideology in any equilibrium resulting from
individually rational decisions. In equilibrium, an agent’s interpretative
strategy and posterior beliefs are pinned down by the agent’s type v, lead-
ing politically opposed groups to disagree on the likelihood of the state ω
even in the face of common information. The evidence that documents
an environmental threat and suggests public preventative measures is re-
jected by voters who oppose regulation, but accepted by the rest of the
political spectrum. Conversely, voters who have a vested interest in public
regulation tend to deny the evidence that substantiates the costs of gov-
ernment intervention. Belief distortion arises on both sides of the political
spectrum, and since updating behavior is monotonic in v, individuals with
the strongest preferences over the possible courses of political action are
the most likely to resort to motivated reasoning, a result that lines up well
with the recent empirical findings of Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015).
This model makes specific predictions about the factors that favor the
emergence of ideological denial, which would not play any role in a standard
model of information processing without motivated beliefs. More precisely,
the model shows that risk denial is strongest in societies where regulation is
least likely to be implemented, either because a large and influential group
of citizens oppose regulation on ideological grounds, or because the political
system is affected by a status quo bias that makes new policies difficult to
implement. In both cases, the low likelihood of an appropriate political
response makes it optimal for all voters to deny the costs associated with
unregulated risk. This result might, for instance, explain why skepticism
vis-à-vis climate change has been particularly strong in the United States,
where a large part of the electorate is intrinsically reluctant to let the
government intervene in the economy, and where institutions are sometimes
considered as “gridlocked,” making the enactment of new policies difficult.
The second set of results, presented in Section 4, analyzes the condi-
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tions under which the model predicts a polarization of beliefs after the
disclosure of common information. Even though individuals resort to mo-
tivated reasoning, they face constraints that limit their capacity to form
preference-consistent opinions. The theory delivers several testable pre-
dictions regarding the type of information that leads to polarization and
disagreement between politically opposed groups, some of which are sub-
stantiated by the experimental literature on disagreement about political
issues. First, the opinions of politically opposed voters polarize if the com-
mon sequence of signals contains arguments in favor of both positions,
something which enables voters to discredit preference-inconsistent signals
and incorporate preference-consistent evidence in their beliefs. The experi-
mental evidence on polarization relies on such mixed signals. For instance,
in the experiment by Lord et al. (1979), participants’ opinions polarize after
they read press articles containing evidence both in favor and against the
death penalty. In contrast, the theory does not predict any polarization
if the groups receive clear-cut evidence in favor of one position: in this
case, individuals are unable to find arguments to rationalize their preferred
cognition, and Bayesian constraints force them to update in the right direc-
tion. Second, the disagreement vanishes if individuals receive unequivocal
evidence, such as an infinite sequence of unbiased signals, which impedes
their ability to self-deceive and eliminates any anomaly in updating. The
model thus predicts that a partisan disagreement can be observed only
temporarily, for issues for which plausible arguments are put forward by
both camps.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide psychological founda-
tions for the existence of partisan disagreement about objective facts, and to
offer a theory that encompasses a wide range of experimental and empirical
evidence. While motivated cognition has already been pointed to by several
scholars as a possible explanation for partisan disagreement (for instance
Sunstein, 2001), this paper is the first to give formal foundations for this ex-
planation, thereby generating precise predictions about the nature of such
disagreement. That liberals and conservatives are motivated and able to
deny different types of signals is not assumed as a primitive proposition but
derived from fundamental and measurable psychological ingredients (mo-
tivated cognition, wishful thinking and heterogeneous preferences over the
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political decisions) that have already been documented and incorporated
into the economics literature (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; Bénabou
and Tirole, 2016). Moreover, while existing theories of disagreement and
polarization (e.g., Rabin and Schrag, 1999) take heterogeneous prior beliefs
as a starting point and only explain the divergence of beliefs between groups
who already disagree, the present model predicts that liberals and conser-
vatives react differently to the first piece of information that they encounter
even if they start with common prior beliefs. This feature allows predicting
the determinants of disagreement about novel and unfamiliar topics, such
as nanotechnologies or geo-engineering. Lastly, in contrast with existing
models, the theory makes predictions about the types of societies and top-
ics for which inaccurate beliefs (here, driven by ideological denial) are the
most likely to arise.
The theory relies on individuals’ desire and capacity to forge illusions
and repress inconvenient truths at the service of their emotional needs.
While standard models predict that signals should be assessed according
to their informativeness alone, evidence from several fields shows that in-
dividuals’ updating behavior is influenced by their needs and desires, a
phenomenon usually referred to as “motivated cognition” (Festinger, 1957;
Kunda, 1990; Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). More precisely, in this model,
individuals’ reaction to information is affected by their desire to form op-
timistic beliefs about their future prospects, in line with the widespread
evidence of unrealistic expectations about future life events (Weinstein,
1980) and wishful thinking (Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Mijovic-Prelec and
Prelec, 2010; Mayraz, 2011). Motivated cognition has been incorporated
into several economic models of belief formation (Brunnermeier and Parker,
2005; Köszegi, 2010; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Bridet and Schwardmann,
2017; Gottlieb, 2018, among others). The contribution of the present paper
relative to this literature is to incorporate this psychological foundation into
a model of voting, and to argue that wishful thinking provides a unifying
explanation for the phenomena of partisan disagreement and polarization.
The closest existing paper is Bénabou (2013), who analyzes collective re-
ality denial on the part of individuals engaged in a joint project. Other
models of wishful thinking in the political context applied to different is-
sues are provided by Bénabou (2008) and Levy (2014).
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Section 1.1 reviews the empirical evidence on partisan disagreement and
polarization, with a particular emphasis on the evidence that speaks in fa-
vor of a theory involving motivated beliefs. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 proves the existence of an equilibrium in a general case, analyzes
the factors that favor the emergence of collective denial, and discusses al-
ternative theories for the existence of a partisan disagreement. Section 4
analyzes the conditions under which the model predicts a polarization of
beliefs between different social groups, and discusses alternative theories of
learning and polarization. Section 5 draws some conclusions and outlines
avenues for future research. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1.1 Empirical evidence
The disagreement between laypeople and experts, and between laypeo-
ple, has been documented in many important areas, and has been the
focus of numerous studies in the social sciences, in particular in the field of
risk perception. While early explanations highlighted cognitive limitations
and the use of inappropriate heuristics (Breyer, 1995; Slovic, 2000), recent
theories and observations have drawn attention to the role of political pref-
erences (see for instance the Cultural Theory of Douglas and Wildavsky,
1982; Douglas, 1994). Liberals and conservatives indeed consistently dis-
agree about the scientific arguments pertaining to several important socio-
economic issues, such as climate change (Dunlap and McCright, 2011), nu-
clear power (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2011), nanotechnologies (Kahan et al.,
2009), gun control (Kahan, 2012), or stem cell research (Nisbet, 2005).
Remarkably, the direction of the disagreement is consistent across these
topics, as liberals always perceive greater objective risks, and thus greater
benefits from regulation, than conservatives.
One remarkable experimental finding is that the provision of balanced
information on a controversial issue does not always reduce the disagree-
ment between politically opposed groups but sometimes aggravates it, as
participants’ beliefs become more extreme in their initial direction after the
provision of mixed evidence. In a classic study, Lord et al. (1979) exposed
proponents and opponents of capital punishment to an identical collection
of research findings containing evidence both in favor and against the de-
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terrent effect of the death penalty. Strikingly, the provision of balanced
information not only polarized the individuals’ attitudes toward the death
penalty (which might be perfectly consistent with the use of Bayes’ rule),
it also strengthened the disparity of views regarding the objective effects of
capital punishment: proponents became more convinced that capital pun-
ishment deters crime, whereas opponents became more convinced that the
death penalty is ineffective. This finding contradicts some basic proper-
ties of Bayesian information processing, according to which the provision
of common information should reduce the discrepancy between views.
Later experiments replicated this finding and extended it to several con-
troversial social issues, such as nuclear power (Plous, 1991) and affirmative
action (Munro and Ditto, 1997). In the case of climate change, the partisan
gap has been growing between 2000 and 2010 while the scientific commu-
nity was producing more evidence of the link between human activities and
the climate (Dunlap and McCright, 2011).3
The correlation between political attitudes and scientific opinions, and
the phenomenon of polarization, admit several plausible explanations, re-
viewed in subsections 3.5 and 4.4. However, a set of experimental results
tend to corroborate the role of motivated reasoning and the causal effect
of political attitudes on beliefs, which are at the core of the present paper.
Whereas the canonical model of learning prescribes that posterior beliefs
depend only on the prior and on the information contained in the signal,
experimental evidence indicates that the formation of beliefs is affected by
the perceived political consequences of the information. As an illustration,
Feinberg and Willer (2010) show that people are more likely to believe in
the conclusions of mainstream climate science when the information deliv-
ers potential solutions (emissions policies, technical innovations, etc.) than
when the message insists on the dire consequences of untreated climate
change.
Interestingly, and consistently with the theory developed in the paper,
the partisan gap is itself affected by the perceived policy implications. In
the experiment by Campbell and Kay (2014), participants read press ar-
3From 2003 to 2013, the fraction of liberals who subscribed to climate science rose
from 68% to 78%, whereas it decreased from 52% to 39% among conservatives (Saad,
2013).
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ticles that documented the scientific consensus on climate change and dis-
cussed potential solutions. In one treatment (“free-market”), the proposed
solution was that the US become the world leader in green industries with-
out any damage to its economy. In the other treatment (“governmental
regulation”), the proposed solution was that the US implement mitigation
policies. Politically conservative participants were more likely to believe
in the theory of anthropogenic climate change if under the first treatment,
namely, if the suggested policy implication fit their political preferences. In
the same vein, the partisan gap was attenuated when geo-engineering was
presented as a potential solution, which reduced skepticism among individ-
uals who opposed regulation (Braman et al., 2012). Several experiments
have shown that framing the information so as to minimize the ideological
implications influences beliefs and attitudes. For instance, conservatives
are more likely to endorse a Pigovian instrument presented as a “carbon
offset” rather than as a “carbon tax” (Hardisty et al., 2010).
A second indication of the existence of motivated beliefs is that indi-
viduals seem prone to reject information that contradicts their ideology
(Kahan et al., 2009). For instance, in the experiment by Nyhan and Reifler
(2010), participants in the treatment group read a summary of the Duelfer
report, whose main conclusion is that Iraq did not have an active program
of weapons of mass destruction in 2003. The treatment worked in the ex-
pected way for liberals, who were less likely to believe in the existence of
the program after reading the summary, but in the opposite way for con-
servatives. Conversely, liberals who believed that President Bush banned
stem cell research do not revise their beliefs when they receive evidence to
the contrary. On a related note, people form their opinions about climate
change in light of their personal experience of the climate, but this percep-
tion is itself politicized: Democrats tend to believe that the temperatures
in their area have recently been warmer than in the past, while Republicans
believe the opposite (Goebbert et al., 2012; Akerlof et al., 2013). These ob-
servations substantiate the causal link from preferences to cognition, which
is at the core of this paper.
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2 Environment
Payoff structure The economy is composed of a continuum of agents of
measure one who have to make a collective decision a ∈ {0, 1}: mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions, instituting gun control, banning research on stem
cells, etc. The decision a = 1 is interpreted as the status quo (laissez-faire
policy), whereas a = 0 corresponds to a risk-prevention policy. The political
decision involves some scientific uncertainty, summarized by a state variable
ω ∈ {L,R}, uniformly distributed. The payoff-relevant variable X equals








be the (common) ex-ante expected value of X.
Once the decision is made, all citizens receive their payoff composed of
a common term equal to Xa and of an idiosyncratic term equal to va. The
parameter v captures an agent’s material or ideological preference regarding
the political decision itself: citizens endowed with v > −x0 tend to support
the status quo whereas those endowed with v < −x0 have an intrinsic
taste for regulation. The variable v is distributed on R according to an
atomless and continuous pdf f . Table 1 summarizes the payoff matrix for
an individual of type v conditional on the state and on the political decision.
ω = R ω = L
a = 1 (laissez-faire) v + xR v − xL
a = 0 (regulation) 0 0
Table 1 – Payoff matrix for a voter of type v
The state ω is thus irrelevant to social welfare if risk prevention policies
are enacted. This assumption entails some loss of generality, since most
regulation instruments (e.g., carbon tax, emissions market, command-and-
control policies) reduce the externality but do not eliminate it entirely. This
assumption is nevertheless maintained in order to simplify the mathemat-
ical expressions, and does not affect the main results. In addition, it can
be considered as an approximation to the fact that the difference in payoffs
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between the states L and R is lower under regulation than under laissez
faire.
Information At t = 0, all voters receive a public informative signal m
about the state. The signal takes only two values: L (“bad news”) or ∅
(“no news”). This assumption is inessential to the main results, and a
symmetric signal structure would yield similar predictions (see Section 4).
The availability of public information is measured by the parameter λ while
its quality is measured by π: conditional on ω = L, the signal L is sent with
probability λπ; conditional on ω = R, the signal L is sent with probability




XL := E[X | m = L] = (1− π)xR − πxL








The parameters satisfy π > 1/2 and λ > 0, which implies that XL <
x0 < X∅. The signal L is to be interpreted as evidence in favor of regula-
tion, whereas ∅ gives support to laissez faire.
Voting The vote takes place at t = 1: each agent selects a ∈ {0, 1}.
The probability with which a political decision is implemented is continu-
ously increasing in the number of citizens who express this preference. For
instance, if legislative power is allocated according to proportional repre-
sentation, the likelihood with which regulatory policies are put in place
increases with the number of representatives who support it. Formally, if ν
is the fraction of citizens who choose a = 1, the probability of implement-




Since there is a continuum of voters, individual voting decisions are
inconsequential, for no citizen is ever pivotal. As usual for large elections,
voters who care only about the political outcome have no strict incentive
to vote. Consistently with theories of expressive voting in large elections,
citizens derive some intrinsic utility from voting according to their true
preference. Hence, a citizen of type v and whose subjective expectation
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equals EX chooses a = 1 if and only if v + EX ≥ 0.4 The thresholds −X∅
and −XL separate the electorate into three parts: the left-wing fraction
characterized by v < −X∅ chooses a = 0 in all states, the right-wing
fraction defined by v ≥ −XL chooses a = 1 in all states, while the remaining
citizens have state-contingent political preferences and might vote for either
policy depending on their beliefs.
Individuals are marginal in the vote. As a consequence, they have
no incentives to form precise beliefs when they choose whether to deny the
evidence or not. The theory concerns large elections where individuals vote
for reasons distinct from instrumental concerns (social norms, the intrinsic
utility of expressing one’s opinion, social pressure, etc.) as documented in,
for instance, Coate et al. (2008) and DellaVigna et al. (2016). Adapting
the theory to a small group where each individual has a non-negligible
probability of being pivotal would require taking into account this extra
incentive as a limit for self-deception.
Formation of beliefs The driving force behind motivated reasoning is
that voters form expectations about their future prospects and derive an-
ticipatory feelings from it. At date 1, prior to the vote, an agent of type v
contemplates the future political outcome and receives a flow of anticipa-
tory utility equal to sE[Xa+ va]. Self-deception consists in creating some
illusory optimism regarding future public decisions by distorting one’s be-
liefs about X and a.
Several modeling strategies are possible to reflect the distortion in the
cognitive process, which are all equivalent provided that they allow for
asymmetric awareness of the signals L and ∅. The present paper follows
the memory management model proposed by Bénabou and Tirole.5 At date
t = 0, the agent can influence the information recalled at t = 1. An agent
who receives bad news (m = L) can repress this information and encode
m̂ = ∅ at a cost c > 0. In contrast, an agent who does not receive any
information (m = ∅) cannot forge a signal between periods 0 and 1 and
4The behavior of the agents who are indifferent between a = 0 and a = 1 does not
matter, since they are marginal and have no impact on the political decision. To avoid
discussing mixed strategies, the model is specified by assuming that they vote for a = 1
with probability 1.
5See Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2011); Bénabou (2013).
12
always transmits m̂ = ∅.
An equilibrium cognitive strategy is a probability σ∗ with which the
agent truthfully transmits m̂ = L conditional on m = L. This model is
a metaphor for the diverse strategies that individuals can employ to bias
their memory or awareness of the facts in their preferred direction: paying
more attention to certain news than to others, rationalizing preference-
inconsistent signals, etc.
In existing models involving anticipatory utility, decision makers trade
off the pleasure of forming rosy beliefs about their future prospects against
the costs of the suboptimal decisions that this distortion creates. In the
setting of the present model, in contrast, each citizen individually has no
influence on the political outcome. As a consequence, citizens do not take
into account any benefit of remaining well informed when they choose their
cognition, and the only force that counterbalances their desire to distort
reality is the cost c associated with cognitive manipulations.
Meta-cognition The equilibrium concept requires that each agent’s cog-
nitive strategies result from an intra-personal information game. This has
two implications: first, self 1 is sophisticated and does not take the mes-
sage m̂ = ∅ at face value but infers a posterior probability for the messages
L and ∅ as a function of self 0’s equilibrium behavior σ∗. Relaxing this
hypothesis and assuming that self 1 does not compute Bayes’ rule after
recollecting m̂ = ∅ reinforces the results of the paper since self-deception
is less constrained in that case. The sophistication hypothesis constitutes
a conservative benchmark under which natural properties of Bayesian up-
dating (in particular, the law of iterated expectations) are preserved. A
second implication is that self 0 finds it optimal to play the equilibrium
action σ∗ conditional on receiving the signal L: agents cannot commit to a
strategy ex ante but react optimally ex post after seeing the information.
Timeline At date 0, all citizens learn their type v and the state of the
world ω is realized. They receive the public message m. If m = L, they
choose the probability with which they transmit it (m̂ = L) or conceal it
(m̂ = ∅). At date 1, they form their recollection m̂, update their beliefs
about m and ω, derive their anticipatory utility sE[Xa + va], and vote.
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- transmit m̂ = L or m̂ = ∅
- receive m̂
- derive sE[Xa+ va | m̂]
- choose a
- a is realized
- derive Xa+ va
b b b
Figure 1 – Timeline
3 Partisan disagreement
3.1 Equilibrium concept
It will become apparent later that all equilibria are symmetric in the
sense that all individuals endowed with the same v play the same equilib-
rium cognitive strategy σ∗(v). A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game
consists of a profile of strategies Σ∗ = {σ∗(v)} for v ∈ R and of a profile of
voting decisions {a(v, m̂)} for v ∈ R, m̂ ∈ {L,∅} such that:
(i) For all v ∈ R, σ∗(v) belongs to
arg max
σ∈[0,1]
σsE[Xa+va | m̂ = L,Σ∗]+(1−σ)
(
sE[Xa+va | m̂ = ∅,Σ∗]−c
)
.
(ii) For all v ∈ R, m̂ ∈ {L,∅}, a(v, m̂) belongs to
arg max
a∈{0,1}
E[X | m̂, σ∗(v)]a+ va.
The expectations that depend on Σ∗ are conditioned both on the agent’s
own equilibrium cognitive strategy and on the other citizens’ strategies.
The agents’ expected payoffs depend on the whole strategy profile Σ∗ in
two ways. First, an agent’s own cognitive strategy influences their pos-
terior beliefs, due to the sophistication hypothesis. Second, other agents’
cognitive strategies influence their vote, and thus the distribution of policy
outcomes, which enters the anticipatory utility term.
The analysis of the equilibrium proceeds in two steps: first, solving for
the individual best response holding fixed the other voters’ behavior, and
then finding a complete equilibrium by means of a fixed-point argument.
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3.2 Intra-personal equilibrium
The behavior of other players matters only insofar as it influences the
relative likelihood of the political outcomes a = 1 and a = 0. Let νL be
the fraction of citizens who vote for a = 1 if the public message L has
been sent; similarly, let ν∅ be the fraction of citizens who vote for a = 1 if
the public message ∅ has been sent. As shown in the Appendix, νL ≤ ν∅
in all equilibria: regulatory policies receive more support when convincing
evidence is presented.
Consider an individual of type v (fixed) who receives the signal L at
date 0. Let us define
U1 [m = L] :=E [Xa+ va | m = L] = (v +XL)φ(νL) (2)
and U1 [m = ∅] :=E [Xa+ va | m = ∅] = (v +X∅)φ(ν∅). (3)
The expression U1[m] represents the agent’s anticipatory utility at date 1
conditional on being certain that the message m was sent.
Equations 2 and 3 yield







where I(v) represents the individual’s benefit from concealing the bad news
L. Two forces influence this expression. The idiosyncratic incentive is re-
lated to the state-independent part of the payoffs. This term is nonnegative
as long as v ≥ 0: right-wing citizens benefit from encoding ∅ since it in-
creases their perceived probability that the decision a = 1 will be chosen.
The common incentive is related to the state-contingent part of the utility:
it is always nonnegative. I(v) is nondecreasing in v: citizens with a stronger
aversion to regulation have higher incentives to deny the risks. This obser-
vation drives the monotonicity of the cognitive strategy in v displayed in
any equilibrium.
In the following, σ∗(v) represents the agent’s tentative equilibrium cog-
nitive strategy, and σ denotes the choice variable following the reception
of a signal equal to L. The analysis consists in finding the unique value
15
of σ∗(v) which is indeed a best response to the equilibrium strategy σ∗(v)
itself. Let





be the ex post probability attached to the public message L by an agent
who recollects m̂ = ∅ given the equilibrium (habitual) cognitive strategy
σ∗(v).
If the agent truthfully encodes m̂ = L, self 1 puts probability 1 on the
hypothesis m = L, which yields the utility
U1[m̂ = L | σ
∗(v)] = U1[m = L]. (6)
If, in contrast, the individual represses the signal and encodes m̂ = ∅, self
1 puts probability µ(σ∗(v)) on the hypothesis m = L, and 1− µ(σ∗(v)) on
the hypothesis m = ∅, which yields
U1[m̂ = ∅ | σ





U1[m = L] +
2− λ
2− λσ∗(v)
U1[m = ∅] (7)
by Equation 5. The agent’s choice of the probability of truthful trans-
mission σ maximizes the date 0 intertemporal utility conditional on σ∗(v),
given by
U0[σ | σ
∗(v)] = σsU1[m̂ = L | σ
∗(v)]+(1−σ)
(




Substituting 6 and 7 into 8 yields
U0[σ | σ





+ sU1[m = L].
A best response is a fixed point of the equation σ∗(v) ∈ arg maxσ U0[σ | σ∗(v)].
Three cases arise:
 If sI(v) ≤ c, σ∗(v) = 1.
16
 If sI(v) ≥
2c
2− λ
, σ∗(v) = 0.




If I(v) ≤ 0, the agent prefers the state where m = L to the state where
m = ∅ and therefore never suppresses the signals equal to L. If I(v) > 0,
the agent’s recall rate is a declining function of the anticipatory term s.
In any case, there is a unique equilibrium characterized by the equilibrium
strategy σ∗(v). Since I(v) is a nondecreasing function of v, it is easy to see
that σ∗(v) is nonincreasing in v: the more an agent opposes regulation, the
more that agent is likely to deny any news that advocates risk-prevention
policies. Lemma 1 summarizes this result.
Lemma 1. Given (νL, ν∅), the best cognitive response σ
∗(v) of an agent of
type v is unique, nonincreasing in v, and nonincreasing in s.
3.3 Inter-personal equilibrium
The equilibrium concept requires that individual cognitive strategies
are derived according to Lemma 1 and that the values of ν∅ and νL are
correctly anticipated by all players. Fix a profile of political outcomes ν =
(ν∅, νL). Consider the profile of cognitive strategies (σ
∗(v, ν))v∈R implied by
the political outcomes ν according to Lemma 1, and the following function.
a(v, m̂, ν) =
{
1 if v + E[X | m̂, σ∗(v, ν)] ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
This function describes the vote of individuals of type v who recollect the
signal m̂ given their cognitive equilibrium strategy σ∗(v, ν). The political




if m = ∅, and
gL(ν) =
∫
[σ∗(v, ν)a(v, L, ν) + (1− σ∗(v, ν)a(v,∅, ν)]dF (v)
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if m = L. An equilibrium of the game is characterized by a fixed point of
the mapping ν → (g∅(ν), gL(ν)) and by the associated individual strategies
{σ∗(v, ν), a(v, m̂, ν)}. The existence of an equilibrium is verified in the
Appendix as an application of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium of the game. In any equilib-
rium, voters form partisan beliefs: there exist some thresholds6 (v− ≤ v+)
such that σ∗(v) = 1 if v ≤ v−, σ
∗(v) is a linearly decreasing function of v
if v ∈ [v−, v+], and σ




Realism Mixed strategy Denial
Figure 2 – Equilibrium cognition
The model therefore predicts a causal link from measurable politi-
cal preference parameters to the contingent beliefs formed about policy-
relevant scientific topics. The main prediction is that agents who have the
greatest stake against government intervention are the most likely to deny
the evidence that calls for regulation.
The fact that agents with a larger v are the most prone to wishful
thinking, while agents with a low v form accurate beliefs, is an artifact of
the asymmetric signal structure considered. In a model with a symmetric
signal structure, the evidence that advocates against regulation would sim-
ilarly be denied by the citizens at the left of the political spectrum, who
have an intrinsic preference for the decision a = 0; the model predicts that
these individuals are likely to form overly optimistic beliefs about the effi-
ciency of government intervention, for instance in economic policies. Such
6The thresholds can take infinite values if σ∗ is constant in v, which is the case when
ν∅ = νL in equilibrium. For instance, it is possible that σ
∗(v) = 1 for all v ∈ R, which
is captured by the case v− = v+ = +∞.
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a signal structure and its implications for disagreement and polarization in
the society are considered in Section 4.
3.4 Determinants of collective denial
We now turn to analyzing the conditions that favor the emergence of
collective denial in the society by studying the comparative static properties
of the cognitive choices in equilibrium. The analysis of the general case is
difficult due to the possibility of multiple equilibria. In this subsection we
therefore consider a special case for the distribution of preferences under
which it is possible to find some conditions that guarantee the uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
We therefore restrict attention to a situation where the distribution
of political preferences is split into two types. A fraction α of citizens
are endowed with a preference parameter vR ≥ −XL and always oppose
regulation; their ideology is strong enough to make information irrelevant
to their vote. The remaining voters have moderate preferences −X∅ ≤
vM < −XL and are therefore likely to follow public recommendations. The
presence of unresponsive voters imposes a lower bound α on the share of
ballots in favor of the status quo. Since the behavior of voters endowed
with a type vR does not vary with their beliefs, the analysis focuses on the
moderates’ cognition and on the resulting political outcome, as a function
of: (i) the distribution of preferences in the society, as given by vM and
α; and (ii) the intensity of the political status quo bias, parametrized by
the shape of φ. Since Proposition 1 requires a continuous distribution of
preferences, the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in that
particular case is established in the Appendix.
In the absence of wishful thinking, moderate voters would vote against
regulation following the message ∅ and in favor of regulation following the
message L. The presence of motivated reasoning affects this outcome, since
the signal equal to L might not be truthfully encoded by the moderates.
If moderate voters play a denial equilibrium, their beliefs are not updated
relative to the prior beliefs, and therefore their vote depends on the sign
of vM + x0. In the exposition, we restrict attention to the case where
vM + x0 ≥ 0. In this situation, moderates who engage in ideological denial
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oppose risk-prevention policies, whereas they would vote a = 0 following
the message L if they were fully informed. However, all comparative statics
results in this section remain true if vM + x0 < 0.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium Let us first analyze the conditions un-
der which a realism equilibrium exists, namely an equilibrium where all
moderate voters play σ∗(vM) = 1. In such a candidate equilibrium, νL = α
and therefore the payoff to moderate voters conditional on m = L equals
(vM +XL)φ(α). A moderate voter who deviates from this equilibrium and
suppresses a signal equal to L ascribes probability 1 to the message m = ∅,
and thus receives an anticipatory term equal to (vM +X∅)φ(1) in that case.
Realism is therefore an equilibrium if and only if
s[(vM +X∅)φ(1)− (vM +XL)φ(α)] ≤ c. (9)
Consider now a candidate denial equilibrium, namely an equilibrium
where all moderate voters repress bad news (σ∗(vM) = 0). All moderate
voters vote against regulation, and thus νL = ν∅ = 1. Denial is therefore




)(X∅ −XL)φ(1) ≥ c. (10)
Equations 9 and 10 are mutually exclusive if and only if α is larger than
some threshold α∗. Thus, the model might admit multiple equilibria if the
number of moderates is large relative to the number of unresponsive voters,
but not otherwise. The intuition is that the moderates’ cognitive strategies
are strategic complements: moderates who engage in denial vote against
regulation, which therefore lowers the payoffs to moderates conditional on
m = L; in turn, this reinforces the incentives of other moderates to self-
deceive as well. This effect is the strongest when α is low, which might
create multiple equilibria in that case.
Comparative statics The left-hand sides of Equations 9 and 10 are the
basic incentives, in the realism equilibrium and in the denial equilibrium
respectively, to deny the signals equal to L and distort one’s beliefs into
thinking that the scientific evidence is equivocal. These equations allow
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analyzing the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium, since the
variations of the parameters that increase these expressions foster denial.
The left-hand sides of Equations 9 and 10 are
(i) nondecreasing in vM : moderate voters are therefore more likely to
repress bad news when their own distaste for regulation becomes more
intense, which increases the relative desirability of the state where
m = ∅, in which regulation is less likely, relative to the state where
m = L.
(ii) nondecreasing in α: moderate voters are less willing to accept the
evidence when the number of opponents to regulation is large, which
makes it more likely that laissez faire will be chosen even if risk preven-
tion is warranted and, in turn, reinforces the incentives to understate
the costs of unregulated risk.
(iii) nondecreasing in φ(1) and in φ(α), for the same reason. As a result,
political systems that are more gridlocked, i.e., where the enactment
of new policies is more difficult, are more likely to favor collective
denial.
Proposition 2 summarizes and formalizes these observations by focusing
on the region where the number of moderates is small, in order to guarantee
the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The threshold α∗ above which the equi-
librium is unique, and the equilibrium cognitive strategy of the moderates
in that region, are written α∗(vM , φ) and, respectively, σ
∗(vM |α, φ), in order
to emphasize the dependence on the values of the parameters. Proposition
2 establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium and the comparative statics
properties described above.
Proposition 2. For any (vM , φ) such that −XL > vM > −x0, there exists a
threshold α∗(vM , φ) ∈ [0, 1] such that, for any α > α
∗(vM , φ), there exists a
unique equilibrium where moderates play the cognitive strategy σ∗(vM |α, φ).
In addition,
(i) collective denial is stronger in societies that have an intrinsic opposi-
tion to regulation:
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 if (vM , α1, α2, φ) satisfy α1 ≥ α2 > α
∗(vM , φ), then
σ∗(vM |α1, φ) ≤ σ
∗(vM |α2, φ).
 if (v1M , v
2




M > −x0 and
α > max(α∗(v1M , φ), α∗(v2M , φ)), then
σ∗(v1M |α, φ) ≤ σ
∗(v2M |α, φ).
(ii) political status quo bias favors collective denial: if (vM , α, φ1, φ2) sat-
isfy φ1(ν) ≥ φ2(ν) for all ν ∈ [0, 1] and α > max(α∗(vM , φ1), α∗(vM , φ2)),
then
σ∗(vM |α, φ1) ≤ σ
∗(vM |α, φ2).
Overall, the political factors that favor collective denial and (inefficient)
opposition to regulation on the part of moderate voters are the following:
(i) moderates’ intrinsic preference for the laissez-faire policy; (ii) strong
political obstacles to regulation that make political change difficult to im-
plement, either due to a large number of ideological opponents, or to the
existence of a status quo bias in the political system.
3.5 Alternative theories
This subsection reviews competing theoretical explanations for the ex-
istence of a partisan disagreement.
Reverse causal link One natural explanation for the correlation be-
tween beliefs and political attitudes is that beliefs about objective facts
causally determine political orientation: liberals and conservatives do not
resort to motivated reasoning but simply hold different prior beliefs or pri-
vate information regarding scientific facts, which causes them to express
different preferences regarding political decisions. Several facts are incon-
sistent with this explanation and tend to corroborate the reverse causal
link, from political preferences to beliefs. First, this theory cannot account
for the evidence reviewed above on non-standard updating behavior, in
particular the fact that liberals and conservatives react differently to infor-
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mation about new issues on which they have little prior knowledge (see for
instance Kahan et al., 2009, on nanotechnologies), and that the perceived
policy implications of the signals affect information processing (Feinberg
and Willer, 2010; Braman et al., 2012; Campbell and Kay, 2014). Second,
voters’ opinions on a range of scientific debates are remarkably correlated
with each other: conservatives and liberals consistently disagree with each
other about environmental threats (climate change, nuclear power), eco-
nomic questions (efficiency of redistributive policies, sources of inequali-
ties), and judiciary issues (deterrent effect of capital punishment, efficiency
of gun control policies). This stylized fact is inconsistent with a model
where individuals’ preferences are determined by independent prior beliefs
or private signals. In contrast, it can be accounted for by the theory de-
veloped in this paper under the assumption that people’s preferences along
these different dimensions (economic policies, judicial policy, regulation)
exhibit some positive correlation, for instance because they reflect an un-
derlying attitude towards individual autonomy and the role of government.
Third, a theory in which beliefs determine political preferences would pre-
dict that beliefs are more precise among more highly educated groups who
have access to more diverse sources of information; Kahan et al. (2012)
shows instead that the disagreement between liberals and conservatives on
climate science is higher among more educated individuals.7 This fact is
consistent with a motivated reasoning explanation under the assumption
that a higher scientific education reduces the cost c of ideological thinking
by making individuals more effective at manipulating the arguments and
at finding preference-consistent sources.
Media bias Another important explanation for the gap between indi-
viduals’ beliefs and experts’ opinions is that the state of science is mis-
represented by the media. Some existing theories can indeed account for
a general misperception of scientific knowledge on the part of laypeople.
Shapiro (2016) develops a model in which newspapers’ incentives to build
a reputation for truthfulness lead them to present mixed evidence even if the
scientific diagnosis is unequivocal, which causes readers to misperceive the
7A Gallup survey also documents that skepticism regarding climate science is the
highest among college educated Republicans (Newport and Dugan, 2015).
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scientific consensus. Bramoullé and Orset (2017) analyze firms’ incentives
to “manufacture doubt” (Oreskes and Conway, 2010) and shape public per-
ception in order to influence regulation. Stone (2016) develops a cheap-talk
setting in which consumers are uncertain about the objectives of the media,
which might have a vested interest in supporting one theory: as a conse-
quence, it might be rational for consumers to update conservatively after
receiving a signal. In these papers, the electorate is homogenous and the
main focus is on the discrepancy between the beliefs held by scientists and
those held by the population. The focus on disagreement and polarization
in this paper therefore takes a complementary perspective to these theo-
ries. In particular, while the models of Shapiro (2016) and Bramoullé and
Orset (2017) can explain the attitude of firms and media outlets regarding
scientific knowledge, it does not capture demand-side effects in information
processing as evidenced by the experimental literature in which the signals
are controlled by an experimenter.
Another strand of the literature has also proposed an explanation based
on a media bias for the persistence of disagreement in the population.
According to this theory, media outlets slant their reports of scientific
arguments, leading different readerships to receive different pieces of in-
formation. A variety of foundations for such a bias have been proposed,
both from the demand-side perspective (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005;
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006, 2010) and from the supply-side perspective
(Baron, 2006; Larcinese et al., 2011). In addition, some empirical evidence
documents that media reports are indeed biased on ideological grounds
(Larcinese et al., 2011; Gentzkow et al., 2014), and that they influence con-
sumers’ attitudes (for instance DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). Explana-
tions for disagreement based on frictions in the news industry predict that
citizens have different beliefs because they are exposed to different sources
of information. The present paper takes a complementary approach to this
literature by analyzing the features of the political environment that favor
belief distortion, allowing for predicting heterogeneity in beliefs between
countries. The theory also predicts that liberals and conservatives react
differently to the same pieces of information, which makes the model suit-
able for accounting for the laboratory evidence of anomalous updating of
beliefs about political issues.
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4 Polarization and disagreement
Besides explaining the existence of partisan disagreements, the theory
of motivated reasoning can also account for the experimental evidence on
anomalous updating behavior discussed in subsection 1.1. In this section we
relate this theory to the existing evidence on polarization and we establish
the following predictions: (i) beliefs of politically opposed groups polarize
if they receive (common) mixed evidence; (ii) politically opposed groups
disagree on the objective facts and form preference-consistent opinions if
they receive mixed evidence; (iii) these phenomena are eliminated if indi-
viduals receive a sufficiently large amount of unbiased information, which
prevents them from rationalizing their preferred opinion; (iv) unlike exist-
ing theories of polarization, beliefs are affected by individuals’ preferences
but not by the order in which the signals are received.
The usual interpretation of the polarization of beliefs is that people are
prone to interpreting ambiguous evidence in light of their prior opinions:
for instance, Lord et al. (1979) write (p. 2099), “... there is considerable ev-
idence that people tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain
their initial beliefs.” The theory developed in this paper takes a different
perspective and considers preferences (instead of prior beliefs) as the source
of the assimilation bias. The dynamics of beliefs predicted by the model
is therefore entirely driven by political attitudes, and does not feature any
history-dependent bias.
We consider two individuals or groups with opposite political prefer-
ences. Group R is in favor of the laissez faire, whereas group L intrinsically
prefers regulation. Both groups receive a common sequence of signals gen-
erated by the information structure introduced in Section 3, the only differ-
ence being that the signal is now symmetric and takes values in {L,R,∅}:
with probability λ, a message m ∈ {L,R} is sent, in which case m = ω
with probability π; with probability 1− λ, the message ∅ is sent.
A cognitive strategy is now a pair (σ−, σ+) of probabilities of transmit-
ting the signals L and R respectively. We do not model the choice of a
cognitive strategy and the voting behavior explicitly, but we assume that
the individuals’ cognitive choices follow the pattern obtained in Section
3: group R denies arguments in favor of regulation and accepts evidence
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against it, whereas group L plays the opposite strategy.
Beliefs are summarized by the random variable ξ = P[ω = R]. The
groups’ prior beliefs are written ξ0R and ξ
0
L, and can be equal or differ-
ent. Both groups receive a common sequence of public signals Mn =




1, · · · , m̂
i
n} accord-
ing to their cognitive strategies. Their posterior beliefs are written ξR(Mn)
and ξL(Mn), respectively.
The analysis consists in comparing the posterior beliefs of the two
groups R and L, depending on the sequence Mn.
The first observation, provided without proof, is that beliefs follow a
martingale process in spite of ideological thinking. The law of iterated ex-
pectations applies, due to the sophistication hypothesis: the expectation of
an individual’s beliefs following a sequence of i.i.d. signals is equal to their
prior. There is therefore no systematic drift towards preference-consistent
opinions. As shown below, this does not preclude ex post polarization and




i for i ∈ {L,R}
4.1 Polarization
We first focus on the conditions under which the opinions of the groups
polarize. Definition 1 is adapted from Baliga et al. (2013) and Benôıt and
Dubra (2015): beliefs polarize if, given an initial disagreement between the
two groups, their beliefs become more extreme in their original direction,
after they both receive the same piece of information.
Definition 1. Suppose that 0 < ξ0L < ξ
0
R < 1. Beliefs polarize following





The information contained in the sequence Mn is summarized by the
vector (nR, nL, n∅): nR is the number of signals equal to R, nL is the
number of signals equal to L, and n∅ is the number of signals equal to ∅.
A member of group R converts the signals equal to L into m̂ = ∅ and
therefore recollects nR signals equal to m̂ = R and nL + n∅ signals equal
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A member of group L recollects nL signals equal to m̂ = L and nR+n∅























be the posterior log-likelihood ratios conditional on receiving, respectively,
a message m̂ ∈ {L,R} or m̂ = ∅. The assumptions λ > 0 and π > 1/2
imply that α > β > 0.












Note that condition 13 depends on Mn and on the information param-
eters (π, λ) but not on the prior beliefs ξ0L and ξ
0
R. Polarization occurs
whenever nL and nR are both large compared to n∅, that is, whenever the
information contained in Mn provides arguments in favor of both opinions.
An immediate corollary is that beliefs polarize if the evidence if perfectly
mixed (nR = nL > 0, n∅ = 0) but not if the evidence is unequivocal (nR = 0
or nL = 0).
Opinions polarize if mixed arguments are provided to the two groups
but not if the information unambiguously recommends one position: the
divergence of opinions requires that arguments advocating both policy ori-
entations are provided, so that each group can rationalize its preferred
opinion. Consistently with this observation, experiments that document a
polarization of beliefs (e.g. Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al., 1993) offer mixed




In addition to predicting biased assimilation, the model also predicts the
direction of disagreement between the two groups, starting from identical
prior beliefs. This distinguishes the theory of motivated reasoning from ex-
isting explanations for the polarization of beliefs, which take disagreement
as a primitive assumption and examine whether balanced information re-
inforces it. In contrast, the theory of motivated reasoning can relate the
disagreement about objective facts to fundamental preference parameters,
and thereby predict the direction of the disagreement in situations where
both groups start with identical prior beliefs (see subsection 4.4 for a dis-
cussion).
To prove this point formally, let us assume that all individuals start
from uninformed prior beliefs ξR = ξL = ξ
0 = 1/2. Proposition 4 compares
the posterior beliefs ξR(Mn) and ξL(Mn) of the groups to each other, and
to the posterior beliefs formed by an individual who is not subject to any
updating distortion and correctly encodes all signals, written ξ(Mn).
Proposition 4. If ξ0R = ξ
0
L = ξ
0 = 1/2, then ξR(Mn) > 1/2 > ξL(Mn)
if and only if Mn satisfies condition 13. In that case, both groups are
overconfident:
ξR(Mn) > ξ(Mn) > ξL(Mn).
Under condition 13, starting from uninformed prior beliefs, individuals
become convinced that the available evidence justifies their preferred policy
orientation, and form beliefs that are too confident (i.e. further away from
1/2) relative to those of a dispassionate statistician who correctly encodes
all signals.
4.3 Asymptotic learning
Lastly, we prove that ideologically-driven disagreement and polarization
vanish when individuals are provided with a large amount of unbiased infor-
mation. Proposition 5 examines the asymptotic properties of the learning
process from the ex-ante point of view. Consider infinite sequences {Mn}
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of i.i.d. signals. Proposition 5 analyzes the limit properties of posterior
beliefs for a given state ω as n becomes asymptotically large.
Proposition 5. Suppose that ξ0i ∈ (0, 1) for i = L,R. Then:
1. If ω = R, limn→+∞ ξi(Mn) = 1 almost surely for i = L,R.
2. If ω = L, limn→+∞ ξi(Mn) = 0 almost surely for i = L,R.
Proposition 5 establishes the consistency of posterior beliefs (parts 1
and 2). Disagreement and divergence of opinions can occur on the path
but vanish when the groups are provided with a sufficiently large number
of signals. Large samples convey overwhelming evidence in favor of the true
hypothesis and the disagreement is therefore eliminated asymptotically due
to the fact that self-deception is limited by Bayesian constraints.
The main conclusion of Propositions 3–5 is that motivated reasoning
might produce a temporary disagreement and polarization on the path,
as documented experimentally. However, a consensus about the objective
facts can still be reached across the political spectrum if strong arguments
are conveyed: the influence of ideological thinking on the formation of be-
liefs should therefore not be overestimated. In the case of climate change,
many studies have shown that individuals vastly underestimate the sci-
entific consensus, and that setting the record straight causes a significant
increase in the acceptance of climate science and in the support for public
action (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Myers et al., 2015; van der Linden et al.,
2015; van der Linden, 2016). Remarkably, this communication strategy is
also effective with conservative citizens.
4.4 Alternative theories
Most existing explanations for the phenomenon of polarization con-
sider an exogenous disagreement and propose a history-dependent updating
rule. In contrast, in the present paper, disagreement arises endogenously
through motivated reasoning and perpetuates itself through the polariza-
tion of beliefs even if the groups have the same prior opinions and receive the
same piece of information. In particular, the updating process is history-
independent, as in Bayes’ rule, but depends upon political preferences.
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Rabin and Schrag (1999) provide the first economic model of confirma-
tory bias. In their theory, individuals misinterpret the signals that con-
tradict their current opinion and encode it, with some probability, as con-
firming rather than contradicting evidence. Fryer Jr. et al. (2017) provide
a foundation for the updating rule used in Rabin and Schrag (1999) by
assuming that individuals interpret mixed evidence as a function of their
beliefs, and recall only their interpretation instead of the raw signals. In
both those papers, the misperception can persist indefinitely and individ-
uals can end up believing with certainty in a false hypothesis.
Other explanations involve departures from the expected utility frame-
work or the common likelihood ratio paradigm. Baliga et al. (2013) pro-
vide a theory of polarization based on ambiguity aversion. In their model,
individuals try to hedge against uncertainty when they make their pre-
dictions. Groups with different prior beliefs are (endogenously) averse to
different directions of ambiguity, which is why they update in different di-
rections. Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) show that, if the state of nature
is multidimensional, the disagreement can be reinforced by the provision
of one-dimensional signals. Benôıt and Dubra (2015) assume that individ-
uals disagree about the likelihood ratios associated with the signals: if the
groups have already been exposed to some information, their idiosyncratic
interpretation of the signals conditions both their current opinion and their
response to new information, which creates a spurious correlation between
beliefs and updating patterns. Acemoglu et al. (2016) consider a related
phenomenon, and prove that individuals might disagree forever absent the
common likelihood ratio assumption.
The preference-based theory of polarization developed in the present
paper differs from existing history-based explanations in several important
ways, both in its applications and in its predictions:
(i) First, the theory requires that individuals have personal stakes in the
outcome. It is therefore unable to explain polarization in situations
where participants have to predict an event that does not affect their
well-being, as in the experiment by Darley and Gross (1983) in which
subjects are asked to assess a schoolgirl’s academic skills.
(ii) Second, as noted above, the updating distortion is affected by pref-
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erences but not by prior beliefs: first impressions do not matter, but
preferences do. The model thus predicts the first movement of beliefs
if people have uninformed prior opinions and receive balanced evi-
dence as the first piece of information. For instance, it explains why
pro- and anti-regulation individuals disagree about the risks associ-
ated with nanotechnologies after receiving information but not prior
to it, as documented by Kahan et al. (2009).
(iii) Third, the framework is entirely Bayesian and individuals’ beliefs sat-
isfy the law of iterated expectations, which is not the case in most of
the papers mentioned above. The results show that this restriction on
belief formation does not preclude polarization contingent on specific
types of signals.
(iv) Fourth, the theory predicts a confirmatory bias if groups have already
formed preference-consistent opinions, but not otherwise. To see why,






receive a preference-inconsistent signal: all members of group L re-
ceive a signal equal to R, whereas all members of group R receive a
signal equal to L. Similarly to existing theories, the present model




> ξR(L). Suppose now that all individuals receive a pub-
lic message containing mixed evidence, for instance a sequence (R,L).
Prior-based theories of polarization predict that each group interprets
the new evidence as a confirmation of their prior opinion, which rein-
forces the disagreement: ξL(R,R,L) > ξL(R) > ξR(L) > ξR(L,R, L).
The model of Section 4 instead predicts that groups update according
to their preference irrespective of their current opinion. This reduces
(or even reverses) the discrepancy of views: ξL(R,R,L) < ξL(R) and
ξR(L,R, L) > ξR(L).
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed that motivated reasoning can explain the exis-
tence and persistence of partisan disagreement about scientific issues. This
theory takes wishful thinking and heterogeneous political attitudes as a
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primitive assumption, and shows that these ingredients can explain a wide
range of empirical observations, including some experimental evidence of
non-standard updating behavior. The main predictions of this model are
that individuals might interpret scientific information in a heterogeneous
manner depending on their stakes in the resulting political decisions, that
collective denial is strongest in societies where appropriate political re-
sponses are least likely, and that this assimilation bias might predict a
(temporary) polarization between politically opposed groups following the
provision of balanced information.
The analysis can be extended in several directions. First, giving more
precise foundations for the model of self-deception, and understanding the
constraints that limit people’s cognitive choices might be helpful for de-
signing efficient communication strategies to limit the effects of motivated
reasoning. Second, the theory assumes that all individuals receive a com-
mon public signal, and therefore remains silent about individuals’ attitudes
towards information sources. Understanding the consequences of motivated
reasoning on individuals’ preferences regarding the type of information re-
ceived might be helpful for predicting their choices in important contexts,
such as the choice of a media outlet, or even the formation of communication
networks contingent on political attitudes. More generally, the interaction
of consumers prone to cognitive distortions with sources of information mo-
tivated by idiosyncratic interests (the media, political parties, firms, etc.)
raises interesting and important questions, that are left for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma A.1. For any intra-personal equilibrium strategy σ∗(v),
E[X | m̂ = L, σ∗(v)] ≤ E[X | m̂ = ∅, σ∗(v)].
Proof. By Bayes’ rule,
E[X | m̂ = L, σ∗(v)] = XL
whereas
E[X | m̂ = ∅, σ∗(v)] = µ(σ∗(v))XL + [1− µ(σ
∗(v))]X∅.
The result follows from XL ≤ X∅.
Lemma A.2. In any equilibrium, ν∅ ≥ νL.
Proof. Consider a profile of equilibrium cognitive strategies Σ∗ = {σ∗(v)}
and the associated votes:
a(v, m̂) =
{
1 if v + E[X | m̂, σ∗(v)] ≥ 0
0 otherwise .
Lemma A.1 implies that a(v,∅) ≥ a(v, L) for all v. The equilibrium









[σ∗(v)a(v, L) + (1− σ∗(v))a(v,∅)]dF (v)
which yields ν(∅) ≥ νL.







1 if sI(v) ≤ c











The monotonicity of σ∗(v) in v follows from Equation 4.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The function g : ν → (g∅(ν), gL(ν)) maps the convex and compact set
{(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 | α ≥ β} into itself, as shown by Lemma A.2. The next
step is to prove that g is continuous in order to apply Brouwer’s theorem
and find a fixed point of g.
To prove the continuity of g, notice that the function (v, ν) → σ∗(v, ν) is
continuous by the construction of lemma 1. As a consequence, the function






which shows that g∅ is continuous in ν (remember that f is continuous).
A similar argument proves the result for gL.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The main text provides the conditions under which realism (Equation
9) and denial (Equation 10) are equilibrium strategies. Consider now a
candidate mixed-strategy equilibrium where the cognitive strategy of the
moderates equals σ∗. In this equilibrium, a fraction σ∗ of the moderates
transmits the signal equal to L and votes for regulation, whereas a fraction
1 − σ∗ conceals the signal and votes for the status quo. Thus, ν∅ = 1
whereas νL = α + (1 − σ
∗)(1 − α). Hence, σ∗ is indeed an equilibrium




[(vM +X∅)φ(1)− (vM +XL)φ(1− σ






[(vM +X∅)φ(1)− (vM +XL)φ(1− σ(1− α))]
defined on [0, 1]. This function is continuously differentiable in σ and its
derivative is of the sign of (after some algebra)
λ[(vM+X∅)φ(1)−(vM+XL)φ(1−σ(1−α))]+(1−α)(2−λσ)(vM+XL)φ
′(1−σ(1−α)).
If α = 1, this expression is strictly positive for any σ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, by con-
tinuity, there exists a threshold α∗(vM , φ) such that, for any α > α
∗(vM , φ),
the function h is strictly increasing in σ. As a result, if α > α∗(vM , φ), there
exists a unique equilibrium of the game in which the moderates’ cognitive





= 1 if h(1) ≤ c,
= 0 if h(0) ≥ c,
is the unique solution to h(σ) = c otherwise.
To prove the comparative statics properties, note that the benefit from
self-deception in equilibrium, given by h(σ∗), is
 nondecreasing in α, since φ is strictly increasing and vM +XL < 0;
 nondecreasing in vM , since φ(1) ≥ φ(1− σ
∗(1− α));
 nondecreasing in φ(1) and in φ(1− σ∗(1− α)).
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3




















− αnL + β(nR + n∅). (A.2)
The condition ξR(Mn) > ξ
0
R is therefore equivalent to
αnR − β(nL + n∅) > 0
whereas ξL(Mn) < ξ
0
L is equivalent to
−αnL + β(nR + n∅) < 0.
This proves the result.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Given ξ0R = ξ
0
L = 1/2, A.1 shows that ξR(Mn) > 1/2 is equivalent to
nRα > (nL + n∅)β, whereas A.2 shows that ξL(Mn) < 1/2 is equivalent to
nLα > (nR + n∅)β. Therefore ξR(Mn) > 1/2 > ξL(Mn) is equivalent to 13.









+ (nR − nL)α.
Thus, using A.1 and A.2, condition 13 is sufficient for ξR(Mn) > ξ(Mn) >
ξL(Mn).
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove part 1 (part 2 is symmetric), suppose that ω = R and consider
an agent belonging to the group R. Consider an infinite sequence of mes-
sages and, for any n > 1, the following random variables: aR(n) is equal
to the number of signals equal to R in the sequence up to date n, aL(n) is
equal to the number of signals equal to L, and a∅(n) is equal to the number









= 1− λπ. (A.3)
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= λπα− (1− λπ)β. (A.4)
The assumptions π > 1/2 and λ > 0 imply that λπα − (1 − λπ)β > 0.












This is true for any infinite sequence that satisfies A.3, namely almost
surely.
We skip the proof of lim
n→+∞
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